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Determinants of value added tax revenue in Kenya 
 
By Nelson H.W. WAWIREa† 
 
Abstract. Past studies that have been undertaken on the responsiveness of Value Added Tax 
revenues to changes in GDP in Kenya have found a positive relationship. However, the 
studies omit key determinants of tax revenues, such as the nature of the tax system, 
institutional, demographic and structural features of the economy. Due to this omission, the 
estimated income elasticities are unreliable for planning purposes, a situation that might be 
responsible for the recurring budget deficits. The specific objectives of the paper are to 
establish the determinants of Value Added Tax revenue and assess yields response to 
changes in bases and reforms. The paper uses Paul Samuelson's (1955) the paper are 
fundamental general equilibrium analysis of the public sector to derive its main results. The 
estimation results show that GDP elasticity is less than the elasticities with respect to 
monetary GDP, suggesting the existence of an underground economy. It is also found that 
tax yields respond with substantial lags to changes in its determinants and revenues are 
sensitive to reforms and unusual circumstances. The study concludes that Kenya’s Value 
Added Tax revenue is very responsive to changes in its determinants especially 
international trade. There is the challenge of creating a stable Value Added Tax system.  
Keywords. Tax revenue, Elasticity, Tax system, Underground economy, Unusual 
circumstances. 
JEL. H25, H24, H27. 
 
1. Introduction 
he major aim of most governments in developing countries is to stimulate 
and guide their economic and social development. These governments 
continue to reach out for the goal of government promoted and directed 
development.  Kaldor (1964) pointed out the importance of government revenue in 
accelerating economic development. Whatever the prevailing ideology or political 
situation of a particular country, it must steadily expand a host of non-revenue 
yielding services such as education, health, infrastructure, and social security. Toye 
(1978) asserted that the link between taxation and economic development is a link 
between a universal desire and a form of government action that is believed to be a 
means to that end. Wildford & Wilford (1978a) asserted that one of the most 
important policy upon which most economists agree is that emerging nations must 
increasingly mobilize their own internal resources to provide economic growth. 
The most important instrument by which resources are marshaled is through the 
implementation of an effective tax policy. 
Tax revenues play a vital role in Kenya’s economic development. This is 
evidenced by the attention problems of taxation have received over the years 
(Republic of Kenya, 1965, Republic of Kenya, 1986, Republic of Kenya, 1994, 
Republic of Kenya, 2000, Republic of Kenya, 2007. Tax Management 
Administration Guidelines (1986) and the Vision 2030 contain reforms in all areas 
of tax policy.  They emphasize the need to raise more revenue without increasing 
the burden of taxation on those who are already contributing to the exchequer.  The 
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tax measures contained in these documents consist of broadening the tax base to 
include additional sector activities and strengthen tax administration. 
These measures were adopted after the government realized that the present tax 
structure does not raise adequate revenues thereby encouraging domestic 
borrowing and seeking external finance, which are only temporary measures of 
deficit financing. Moreover, external funds can no longer be relied on due to donor 
conditions and the increasing interest to channel funds to Eastern Europe after the 
cold war (Gelb, 1993).  Furthermore, potential sources for domestic borrowing are 
few and external grants reduce autonomy and increase political and economic 
dependence. The alternatives are therefore to raise money through taxation, curtail 
desired government expenditures, or continuously revise the tax structure. 
The main shortcoming of Kenya’s tax structure since independence has been its 
over-dependence on a small number of sources of tax revenue, namely trade taxes, 
sales tax/ value added tax (VAT) and income tax (Ole, 1975, Wawire, 1991, 
Wawire, 2000, Muriithi & Moyi, 2003, Wawire, 2003 and Wawire, 2006).  The 
trade taxes, sales tax/VAT on various imported products are vulnerable to external 
events because their prices are determined in the world market and tend to be 
volatile. This has resulted in inadequate tax revenues and continuous existence of 
budget deficits. 
The sources of inadequacy of revenue from taxation include tax structure that is 
not buoyant or income-elastic, a long time lag between government revenue 
collection and spending, lack of fiscal discipline, reluctance of the government to 
control its expenditures, and lack of information about the behaviour of Kenya’s 
tax revenue functions. The later forms the thrust of this paper and therefore the 
behaviour of Kenya’s VAT revenue functions receives special attention. 
 
1.2. The Statement of the Problem 
Several studies have been undertaken on the response of tax revenues to 
changes in GDP (Ghai, 1965, Ole, 1975, Wilford & Wilford, 1978a; 1978b, 
Wawire, 1991, Osoro, 1993; 1995, Ariyo, 1997, Wawire, 2000, Muriithi & Moyi, 
2003, Wawire, 2003). In Kenya, such studies have found a positive relationship 
between tax revenues and GDP. However, these studies omitted some key 
determinants of tax revenues, such as the nature of the tax system, and institutional, 
demographic and structural features of the economy.  
Specific determinants that are usually omitted include: unusual circumstances 
that have been experienced in the economy such as coffee and tea booms, oil 
shocks, drought, labour unrest, 1982 coup d’état attempt, political uncertainty in 
the wake of multi-party elections, tribal clashes of 1991, 1992, 1997, and 2008; 
power rationing in 2000. The examples of new taxes attempt that have been 
introduced include sales tax in 1973, and VAT in 1990.  
Due to the omission of some of the determinants of tax revenues and per capita 
tax revenues, the estimated income elasticities of VAT revenues are often 
inaccurate and unreliable for planning purposes, a situation that might be the cause 
of recurring budget deficits. This is because these factors that are often omitted, if 
their effects are significant, may change the slope and/or the intercept of the VAT 
revenue function making it difficult to predict accurately the revenues.  
Furthermore, studies that have been done on this topic use annual total GDP 
data while VAT revenue data are collected and reported as per fiscal year, which 
starts on 1st July each calendar year and ends on 30th June the following calendar 
year. It is therefore vital that any study to identify the determinants of VAT 
revenues should use average GDP. Moreover, it is also important to assess the 
response of VAT revenues to changes in monetary GDP. This would indicate the 
extent to which monetization of the economy and subsequent reduction in black 
market activities would affect these revenues.  
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1.3. The objectives and significance of the study 
The specific objectives of the paper are to establish the determinants of Value 
Added Tax revenue and assess the response of VAT structure to changes in tax 
bases and tax reforms. The study is important because its results can be used to 
design pro-growth tax policies and implement tax changes that are equity 
enhancing. 
The study contributes to the existing literature on the VAT structure in Kenya. 
The results could be used to design growth-oriented programmes and carry out tax 
changes that are growth enhancing. The study provides an empirical groundwork 
on Kenya’s VAT revenue structures upon which prudent tax measures could be 
based. It identifies the determinants of VAT revenues which when properly 
understood, documented, and captured in relevant tax revenue models, would make 
it possible to estimate accurately VAT revenues within a specified period of time. 
The study also stimulates further research in the area of taxation. It provides an 
informed basis for taking action on tax policy in addition to filling the gap about 
what is currently known about VAT revenue function in Kenya. The study is 
timely given the current effort to implement the constitution, change government 
structures, privatize state enterprises, rationalize the budget, eradicate poverty, 
reform tax structure and continue with the structural adjustment process. 
 
1.4. Scope of the Study 
The study is limited to the period 1963/64 to 2008/09 for a number of reasons. 
This period is long enough to capture the responsiveness of VAT revenues to 
changes in its determinants. Furthermore, the government had the opportunity to 
devise its own tax policies within this period.  
It was within this period that the economy grew rapidly up to early 1970’s. 
After the magical growth rate, it started experiencing fiscal strains, with 
expenditure rising more rapidly than domestic revenues due to large-scale 
infrastructure investment and other social expenditures. The economy also 
experienced persistent shocks such as the oil price crises of 1973 and 1979 that had 
far reaching repercussion on growth and fiscal deficits. It is possible in this period, 
to capture the effects on VAT revenues of such events like trade liberalization, 
privatization, tax modernization programme and the establishment of KRA.  
During the study period, sales tax was introduced in 1973, in the fiscal year 
1984/85, sales tax on domestic manufactures was separated from the one on 
imports, and VAT Act Cap 476 started operating on 1st January 1990. In a 
nutshell, this period is significant because it coincides with import substitution 
industrialization strategy, the onset of debt crisis in 1970’s, the SAPs in 1980’s, the 
liberalization policies of 1990’s, and multiparty era of 1990’s, 2000’s and the 
Kenya’s Vision 2030. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Estimating Techniques for Buoyancy of VAT 
Several studies have used GDP as a determinant of tax revenue.  Such studies 
include Ole (1975), Wilford & Wilford (1978a and 1978b), Rao (1979), Omoruyi 
(1983), Asher (1989), Osoro (1993 and 1995), Ariyo (1997), Wawire, (2000), 
Muriithi & Moyi, (2003) and Wawire, 2003). In these studies, the following model 
was used to estimate tax buoyancy.  
 
T = e Y e         (1) 
 
Where T = tax revenue 
 Y = income (GDP) 
  = constant term 
  = buoyancy coefficient 
 e = natural number 
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The double-log version of equation (1) is estimated using OLS.  
2.2. Estimating Techniques   
2.2.1. Proportional adjustment method  
The first is the proportional adjustment method. This was suggested by Sahota 
(1961) and Prest (1962) and later described by Mansfield (1972) and used by 
Omoruyi (1983), Osoro (1993), and Ariyo (1997). The method involves isolating 
the data on discretionary revenue changes based on data provided by the 
government.  The resulting data reflect only what the collections would have been 
if the base year structure had been in force throughout the sample period (Osoro, 
1993).  The adjusted data is then used to estimate equation (2) that follows. 
 
InT p =  p +  p InY +  p        (2) 
 
Where p provides an estimate of the income elasticity of the p
th tax. 
There are several shortcomings of proportional adjustment method as cited by 
Ariyo (1997). To start with, data on revenue receipts directly and strictly attributable 
to discretionary changes in tax policy are not available. In fact, it relies on budget 
estimates for discretionary effects of tax revenue, which tends to differ substantially 
from the actual tax revenue collected. The approach assumes that the discretionary 
changes are as progressive as the underlying tax structure, hence it is contingent on 
the assumption that discretionary changes are more or less progressive than the tax 
structure they modify (Leuthold & N’Guessan, 1986 and Chipeta, 1998). Further, the 
approach is highly aggregative compared to other methods highlighted in this section.  
2.2.2. Dummy variable technique  
The second method for estimating income elasticity of a tax is to use the dummy 
variable technique developed by Singer (1968). The method introduces a dummy 
variable into equation (2) for each year in which there was an exogenous tax policy 
change.  The resulting estimating model becomes: 
 
InT p  =  p  +  p InY + iDi + p       (3) 
 
Where the dummy variable Di (i = 1, 2, …) takes the value of zero (0) before the 
discretionary change and one (1) after the change. The coefficient p estimates the 
revenue elasticity. The summation accounts for the possibility of multiple changes in 
the period (Wilford & Wilford, 1978a; 1998, and Osoro, 1993). However, Ariyo 
(1997) suggested additional modifications to models (2) and (3). The first 
modification is the introduction of a one-year lag in GDP. The argument is that new 
policy guidelines contained in a budget speech may not be implemented until the 
relevant circulars are issued. The one-year lag in income (GDP) added to equations 
(2) and (3) captures the potential effects on tax revenues due to implementation time 
lag. If there are pronounced administrative lags or delayed remittances, the lagged 
value will be more significantly associated with the dependent variable in each 
equation. 
The second modification involves the introduction of a slope dummy in equation 
(3).  The argument is that over a long period of time or under unusual circumstances, 
not only do the intercepts change but also their slopes may change (Koutsoyiannis, 
1988). Ariyo (1997) argued that policy proposals in the budget are based on the 
performance of each tax revenue source in the preceding period. Those that perform 
above expectation are given more ambitious targets in the new fiscal year and put 
under great surveillance.  Ariyo’s (1997) non-dummy and dummy models are given 
as: 
 
InTt = 0 + 1InYt + 2lnYt-1+        (4) 
InTt = 0 + 1InYt + 2lnYt-1 + 3D1+ 4D2 +      (5) 
 
Where Yt-1 = previous level of income (GDP) 
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   Tt = total tax revenue 
   Yt = income (GDP) 
   t = year 
   D1 = intercept dummy 
   D2 = slope dummy (D2 = D1*Yt ) 
Khan (1973) has applied this method in estimating the responsiveness of tax yields 
to increases in national income and tax revenue forecasting. The shortcomings of this 
technique are that the method becomes impossible to use where tax policy changes are 
too frequent and also creates a potential multicolinearity problem from the inclusion 
of more than one dummy variable into the tax function. 
2.2.3. Constant Rate Structure 
The third method of estimating tax elasticity, as used by Andersen (1973) for 
Denmark & Choudhry (1975) for west Malaysia, is the Constant Rate Structure. The 
method involves collecting statistics on actual tax receipts and data on monetary value 
of the legal tax bases and corresponding revenues. The tax bracket of the base year is 
then multiplied by the corresponding base values and the products summed up. The 
simulated tax revenue data is then regressed on GDP. However this method can only 
be applied if the number of items is small, the range of tax rates is narrow and the data 
can be compiled easily. Furthermore, this method requires highly dis-aggregated data 
and detailed tax base series for all individual taxes and this could be difficult to obtain, 
besides getting the same tax base over time.  
2.2.4. Divisia Index 
The fourth method of estimating elasticity of a tax is the Divisia Index, which 
introduces a proxy for discretionary tax measures. The index measures the technical 
change, which is taken as the effects of discretionary changes in tax yields. The index 
is derived from the estimated tax function analogous to the production function. The 
tax function must be well defined, continuously differentiable and homogeneous of 
degree one. The method is best suited where the revenue effects of discretionary 
measures are not available. It uses time trends as proxies for discretionary changes. 
This is its major weakness because it introduces bias, leading to either an 
overestimation or underestimation of the adjusted tax revenues (Choudhry, 1979).  
Choudhry (1979) carried out a detailed comparison of these methods.  The study 
concluded that the Proportional Adjustment method was more superior compared to 
the Dummy Variable Approach, Divisia Index method, and Constant Rate Structure 
method. The study found that the Constant Rate Structure method had the smallest 
elasticity estimates. This was probably due the generation of a simulated tax revenue 
series on the basis of the effective tax rate for a given reference year. 
  
2.3. Empirical Literature 
The studies that have measured the impact of GDP on tax revenues include 
Wilford & Wilford (1978a) who estimated income-elasticity and buoyancy of the tax 
revenue in Central America for the period 1955 to 1974, using an exponential tax 
revenue function. The study found that income elasticity of the tax revenue was less 
than unity.  This suggested that the tax structure was stable and therefore tax revenue 
grew less than proportionately in response to growth in income. 
 Osoro (1993) examined the revenue productivity implications of tax reforms in 
Tanzania. In the study, the tax buoyancy was estimated using double log form 
equation (2) and tax revenue elasticity using the proportional adjustment method 
(equation 4). The argument for the use of proportional method was that a series of 
discretionary changes had taken place during the sample period, 1979 to 1989, 
making the use of dummy variable technique impossible to apply (Osoro, 1993). For 
the study period, the overall elasticity was 0.76 with buoyancy of 1.06. The study 
concluded that the tax reforms in Tanzania had failed to raise tax revenues. These 
results were attributed to the government granting numerous tax exemptions and poor 
tax administration.  
Ariyo (1997) evaluated the productivity of the Nigerian tax system for the period 
1970-1990. The aim was to devise a reasonable accurate estimation of Nigeria’s 
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sustainable revenue profile. In the study, tax buoyancy and tax revenue elasticity were 
estimated using equation (4) and (5) respectively. The slope dummy equations were 
used for the oil boom and SAPs. It was found that on the overall, productivity level 
was satisfactory. However, the results indicated wide variations in the level of tax 
revenue by tax source. The variations were attributed to the laxity in administration of 
non-oil tax sources during the oil boom periods. Significant reduction in public 
expenditure and prudent management of financial resources were suggested as 
solutions to the fiscal deficit. The study further asserted that there was need to 
improve the tax information system to enhance the evaluation of its performance and 
facilitate adequate macro-economic planning and implementation (Ariyo, 1997). 
Chipeta (1998) evaluated effects of tax reforms on tax yields in Malawi for the 
period 1970 to 1994. The results indicated buoyancy of 0.95 and an elasticity of 0.6. 
The study concluded that the tax bases had grown less rapidly than GDP. Kusi (1998) 
studied tax reform and revenue productivity of Ghana for the period 1970 to 1993. 
Results showed a pre-reform buoyancy of 0.72 and elasticity of 0.71 for the period 
1970 to 1982. The period after reform, 1983 to 1993, showed increased buoyancy of 
1.29 and elasticity of 1.22. The study concluded that the reforms had contributed 
significantly to tax revenue productivity from 1983 to 1993. 
Milambo (2001) used the Divisia Index method to study the revenue productivity 
of the Zambian tax structure for the period 1981 to 1999. The results showed elasticity 
of 1.15 and buoyancy of 2.0, which confirmed that tax reforms had improved the 
revenue productivity of the overall tax system. However, these results were not 
reliable because time trends were used as proxies for discretionary changes and this 
was the study’s major weakness. 
In relation to Kenya, Ole (1975) estimated income elasticity of tax structure for the 
period 1962/63 to 1972/73. Tax revenue was regressed on income without adjusting 
for unusual observations. The results showed that the tax structure was income 
inelastic (0.81) for the period studied. The study recommended that the system 
required urgent reforms to improve its productivity. The results also implied that 
Kenya’s tax structure was not buoyant and therefore the country would require foreign 
assistance to close the budget deficit.  
Njoroge (1993) studied the revenue productivity of tax reforms in Kenya for the 
period 1972/73 to 1990/91. Tax revenue was regressed on income after adjusting tax 
revenues for discretionary changes. The period of study was divided into two to make 
it easier to analyze the effects of tax reforms on revenues from various taxes. Income 
elasticity of total tax structure was found to be 0.67 for the period 1972 to 1981. This 
meant that the government received a decreasing share of rising GDP as tax revenues. 
The elasticity estimates for individual taxes were as follows: sales tax 0.6, import 
duties 0.45 and income tax 0.93. The buoyancy for the overall tax system for the same 
period was 1.19, implying that the tax system was quite buoyant. For the period 1982 
to 1991, Njoroge (1993) found that the overall elasticity was 0.86 while buoyancy was 
1.00. The study concluded that from a revenue point of view, the system did not meet 
its target, hence it required constant review as the structure of the economy changes. 
However, the results could not be relied upon because the study never took into 
account time series properties of the data. 
Adari (1997) study focused on the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in Kenya 
that replaced sales tax in 1990. The study analyzed the structure, administration and 
performance of VAT. The estimated buoyancy and elasticity coefficients were less 
than unity implying a low response of revenue from VAT to changes in GDP. This 
suggested the presence of laxity and deficiencies in VAT administration. However, 
the estimation of buoyancy and elasticity coefficients were done in total disregard of 
the time series properties and without taking care of unusual observations in the data. 
Therefore, the results were not reliable for planning purposes. 
Wawire (2000) used GDP to estimate the tax buoyancy and income-elasticity of 
Kenya’s tax system. Tax revenues from various sources were regressed on their tax 
bases. Based on empirical evidence, the study concluded that the tax system had failed 
to raise necessary revenues. However, the shortcomings of the study were, first, it 
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never considered other important determinants of tax revenues, for example, unusual 
circumstances that could have affected tax revenue productivity. Second, it never 
disaggregated tax revenue data by source hence it was difficult to say which taxes and 
bases contributed more to the exchequer. Third, it never took into account the time 
series properties of the data. 
Muriithi & Moyi (2003) applied the concepts of tax buoyancy and elasticity to 
determine whether the tax reforms in Kenya achieved the objective of creating tax 
policies that made yield of individual taxes responsive to changes in national income. 
They used equation 2 to estimate the responsiveness of tax yields on income. The 
results showed that tax reforms had a positive impact on the overall tax structure and 
on individual tax handles. The study concluded that despite the positive impact, the 
reforms failed to make VAT responsive to changes in income. However, VAT had 
been around for about eleven years only and subjecting it alone in a regression model 
did not make statistical sense. The current study differs from this study because it 
separates the effect of average monetary GDP and average total GDP on tax revenue 
and uses average figures instead of the annual ones because the tax revenue figures 
are on fiscal year basis that starts on 1st July while the GDP figures are on calendar 
year that starts on 1st January. 
In an attempt to highlight the trends in Kenya’s tax ratios, tax effort indices and 
their implication for further tax reforms, Wawire (2003; 2006) performed a regression 
of tax revenue on income. The estimated tax equation was used to compute tax effort 
indices by dividing the predicted with the actual figures. After examining the tax 
effort indices, the study concluded that the slowdown in economic growth had 
resulted in high levels of taxation that did not match delivery of public goods and 
services. The study however, never took into account the time trend characteristics of 
variables that were used. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The analysis in this study closely followed Paul Samuelson's fundamental general 
equilibrium analysis of public sector activities (Samuelson, 1954, 1955, Musgrave, 
1986, Chipman, 1982, Bolnick, 1978, Varian, 1992, Barnett, 1993). The model that 
the study uses is constructed taking into account the demand side for government 
financing of public goods provision. It emphasizes the optimal allocation of resources 
between the public and private goods. The model is relevant to the study because it 
considers both the government revenue and its expenditure to provide the public 
goods. Moreover, it is a model of resource allocation that can be modified to 
emphasize the interaction between desired levels of public goods provision and the 
economic cost of levying taxes (Barnett, 1993).   
To model, assume that there is a pure private good (Qp) and a pure public good 
(Qg). Control of all resources initially lies with the private sector, and must be 
transferred to the public sector for producing Qg. Increasing marginal opportunity cost 
characterizes this transference activity. This marginal cost includes resources used 
directly to levy taxes plus loss of Qp through dampened incentives and reduced 
efficiency in the private sector resulting from the tax policies (Branson, 1989, Agénor 
& Montiel, 1996, Froyen, 2002, Dornbusch, Fischer & Startz, 2003). 
Assume further that the government fully finances its activities through taxes. Also 
assume a set of individualistic preferences, Ū (Qg, Qp) embodying continuously 
diminishing marginal rates of substitution between the public and private goods 
(Bolnick, 1978, Stiglitz, 1988, Barnet, 1993). This preference function is assumed to 
be a characteristic of Scitovsky’s social indifference curves (Samuelson, 1976, 
Scitovsky, 1941; Layard & Walters, 1978, Mishan, 1981) or Bergson-Samuelson 
social welfare function (Varian, 1997, Bergson, 1938, and Samuelson, 1977).  
The demand function for the public good is derived by considering a model of 
utility-maximizing behavour coupled with a description of underlying economic 
constraints. The basic assumption is that a rational individual will always choose a 
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most preferred bundle (x) that consists of both public and private goods from a set of 
affordable alternatives (X) that satisfy the individual’s budget constraint. If Y is a 
fixed amount of income available to the individual and p = (pg, pp) is the vector of 
prices for a public good (pg ) and a private good (pp ), the  set of affordable bundles 
and the budget of the individual  could be given by: 
 
B = {xin X: PX ≤ Y} 
 
The problem of utility maximization is then expressed as: 
 
Max U(x) 
Such that PX ≤ Y and x is inX 
 
However, under the local nonsatiation assumption, a utility-maximizing bundle x* 
must meet the budget constraint with equality (Varian, 1992). This allows the 
restating of the utility problem in indirect form as: V (P, Y) = Max U(x) 
 
Such that PX = Y 
 
The value of x that solves this problem is the individual’s demand bundle which 
expresses how much of each good the individual would buy at given levels of prices 
and income. The function that relates P and Y to the demanded bundle, conditional on 
other covariates is the individual’s demand function. 
The individual’s bundle that maximizes utility is at a point where the budget line is 
tangent to the indifference curve (Stiglitz, 1988). Therefore, a rational individual 
would choose to allocate the income between public and private goods in such a way 
that the marginal rate of substitution of the public good for private good (MRS g,p) 
equals the ratio of their prices, i.e, MRS g,p = -
p
g
p
p
(see also Mansfield, 1975, 
Silberberg, 1990, and Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1996). However, according to Nath 
(1979), free foreign trade may prevent efficient allocation of income over time (see 
also Agénor & Montiel, 1996). This implies that for optimum allocation, the marginal 
benefit of any good must be equal to its marginal cost which should be equal to its 
world price in a competitive foreign market. Therefore, MRS g,p= -
p
g
P
P
= - 
pw
gw
P
P
. 
Figure 1 illustrates this condition at the tangency of the budget line with the 
indifference curve for a taxpayer. 
 
 
Figure 1. Utility-maximizing conditions 
 
Qg* and Qp* are the optimal quantities that should be provided for the public and 
private good respectively. The position and slope of the budget line depends on 
income and the prices of the public good and the private good. For each level of 
income, there will be some optimal choice for each of the goods. For the public good 
(Qg), the optimal choice at each set of prices and income will be the demand function.  
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(3), N.H.W. Wawire, p.322-344. 
330 
The demand equation of the following general form is often estimated: Qg =f (pg, y, 
z); where Qg represents the demand for the public good for an individual, pg is the 
price an individual pays for a unit of the publicly provided good, y is the income of 
the individual, and z is a vector of variables reflecting such things as the economic and 
political composition of the economy (Barnett, 1993). Y is exogenously determined, 
while pg is dependent on the tax share which in turn depends on the form of the tax 
base. The demand curve is actually the marginal willingness to pay curve (Stiglitz, 
1988). At each level of output of the public good, the demand curve shows how much 
the individual would be willing to pay for an extra unit of the public good. The tax 
price for the public good at the optimal level is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution which is the amount of the private good that an individual must give up 
for one more unit of the public good.  
When income changes, the vertical intercept of the budget line is altered but its 
slope does not change if prices are fixed. With an increase in income, the budget line 
shifts outwards parallel to the original one. The individual can now purchase more of 
both goods and attain a higher utility-maximizing consumption choice for both public 
and private goods. The resulting locus of utility-maximizing bundles is known as the 
income expansion path (Silberberg, 1990, Varian, 1992, Varian, 1997).  
From the income expansion path, an Engel curve is derived which relates income 
to the quantity demanded of the public good. A straight income expansion path leads 
to a linear Engel curve through the origin. In this case the individual’s demand curve 
has unit income elasticity. This implies that the individual will demand the same 
proportion of each commodity at each level of income (Varian, 1992). However, in 
the case of utility-maximizing consumption choice, the income expansion path is 
expected to bend towards the private good implying that as the consumer gets more 
income, more of both goods are demanded but proportionately more of the private 
good than the public one. Figure 2 that follows is the income expansion path for a 
utility-maximizing consumer. 
 
 
Figure 2. The income expansion path 
 
I1, I2 and I3 are indifferent curves. In the case of a bending income expansion path 
like the one above, the resulting Engel curve bends towards income implying that as 
the consumer’s income increases, proportionally less of the public good is demanded. 
This is presented graphically in the following figure. 
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Figure 3. The Engel curve 
 
Suppose the government wishes to tax a utility-maximizing individual in order to 
obtain a certain amount of revenue that is used to provide the public good the 
individual consumes, the revenue obtainable would be determined by the tax bases 
especially the individual’s income. In this study therefore, total tax revenue is taken as 
a function of per capita income. This relationship paves the way for the estimation of 
Engel curves that relate the amount of tax revenues from various taxes to income 
(GDP).  
At the empirical level, tax revenue functions are proxies for Engel curves. Since 
taxes are used to finance public goods, a relationship of tax revenue to income is but a 
proxy for the relationship between consumption of a public good and income, which 
is a public good’s Engel curve. The factors that shift the Engel curves were identified 
to include monetary GDP, the degree of openness of the economy as measured for 
example, by the volume of international trade, population, unusual circumstances, 
introduction of new taxes, establishment of KRA, introduction of SAPs, trade and 
financial liberalization, tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax exemptions, free riding 
strategy by some individuals, and discretionary changes in the tax bases, tax rates, 
tax legislation, tax administration, and collection techniques. 
 
3.2. Empirical Model  
The multiplicative functional form of tax revenue model is specified as:  
 
T = eY e               (6) 
 
Where: T  = tax revenue 
   = estimated parameter 
 Y  = income 
   = constant term 
   e = natural number 
  = error term 
As noted in the literature review, this specification follows standard practice in 
this area (See example, Ole, 1975, Wilford & Wilford, 1978a and 1978b, Rao, 
1979, Omuroyi 1983, Asher, 1989, Osoro, 1993 and 1995, Ariyo, 1997, Wawire, 
2000, Muriithi & Moyi, 2003, and Wawire, 2003). 
To estimate the parameters using OLS method, the multiplicative equation is 
linearized by taking the logarithms of the variables in the empirical model 6 and 
introducing an error term   and the subscript i, for a particular source of tax 
revenue. Therefore, the general estimating equation is: 
 
InT i = i +  i InY + i         (7) 
 
Where, Ti  revenue from the ith source  
 i = elasticity coefficient 
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The foregoing approach does not pay attention to the special characteristics of 
the nature of the tax system and institutional and demographic factors that shape 
the trends in the economy. Considering the fact that tax revenues might change 
over time due to changes in the exogenous variables, the equations presented above 
are re-specified and some re-parameterized and dummies defined for discretionary 
changes, unusual circumstances and events. Dummies were introduced in those 
years where reforms and unusual observations were detected through various 
diagnostic tests following Johnston & Dinardo (1997), Thomas (1997), Kennedy 
(1989), Maddala (1977), Wilford & Wilford (1978a). The estimating equation is re-
specified as: 
 
 eeT YDi          (8) 
 
Where D = 0 for no unusual observation(s), and D = 1 for unusual observation(s), 
while  measures the tax revenue-income elasticity. Taking logarithm of equation (8), 
the estimating equation where unusual observations are detected is: 
 
YDT tit
k
i
lnln
1
 

+  i       (9) 
 
Where T = revenue from the ith source. 
   = income elasticity of the tax revenue. 
   = dummies representing unusual circumstances 
A slope dummy maybe introduced in equation (9) by interacting Y with a 
dummy variable. This is because over a long period of time and under unusual 
circumstance, not only do intercepts change but also slopes may change 
(Koutsoyanniss, 1988, Ariyo 1997). Furthermore, lags in GDP are introduced in 
the model because new policy guidelines contained in the budget speech are not 
usually implemented until the relevant circulars are issued to the implementing 
departments. The lags capture the potential effects of the implementation time lag.  
 
The following tax revenue equations are estimated. 
 
InT t = i +  1 InY t +  2 InY t-1 +   t                (10) 
InT t = 1121 **
1
i 

 tttttttjt YDYDInYInYD i
k
t
 +   t.            (11) 
  
Where,  
 tY    = current income 
 1tY    = previous year income 
 Dt   = intercept dummy variables 
 Dt*Yt and Dt*Yt-1 = interaction terms 
 i    = coefficient of intercept dummies, 1…i 
 
i
   = estimated parameters for slope dummies, 1…i   
 t   = year.  
 T   = total tax revenue 
  1,  2, 21,  and  =  elasticity estimates 
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Dummies are included in the model only if they enhance the predictive power 
of the model by improving adjusted R-squared, Durbin-Watson (D.W) statistic and 
reduce the standard error of regression. From the equations that were estimated and 
found to be well specified on statistical grounds, some have more than two lags. 
For these equations, acceptable first formulations were reached at, and a search for 
acceptable simplification is performed following Johnston & Dinardo (1997) 
procedures.  
The appropriate number of lags for each estimated equation was determined on 
the basis of Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz criterion (SC). 
The specification that minimized the Akaike information criteria was selected. 
However, in choosing the number of lags, caution was taken because although 
longer lag lengths are appropriate since they fully capture the dynamics of the 
system being estimated and increases the parameters that are estimated, they reduce 
the degrees of freedom and increase data requirement.  
The average values for the independent variables are the average of that year 
and the previous year’s. The average values were used because the figures for 
independent variables are usually given per calendar year while those of dependent 
variables are given as per fiscal year that starts on July 1st of each calendar year. 
 
3.3. Stationarity of variables 
Time series analysis is central to the understanding and empirical modeling of 
dynamic response of tax revenues to changes in their determinants. The non-
random behaviour of time series data would have therefore, undermined the 
usefulness of the standard econometric methods had they been applied in the study 
without considering time series properties (Russell & Mackinon, 1993, Gujarati, 
1995, Adam 1998, Johnston & Dinardo, 1997, Hill, Griffith & Judge, 2001). 
Regression on such data would have been spurious and inconsistent because a 
common time trend is shared (Yule, 1926, Granger & Newbold, 1974, Russell & 
Mackinnon, 1993, Hill, Griffith & Judge, 2001).  
One way that is used to detect the presence of spurious correlation is by the use 
of the D.W statistic. The standard rule that is applied is that if the adjusted R-
squared is greater than the D.W statistic, there is an increasingly high probability of 
spurious correlation that cannot be solved by increasing the sample size. The 
second method is to use the Breusch-Godfrey asymptotic (LM) test for serial 
autocorrelation.  
The formal statistical test for the presence of a unit root was used to detect non-
stationary variables in this study. The test procedures followed that were are those 
of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) as explained by Dickey & Fuller (1979), 
Mackinnon, (1991), and Thomas (1997).  
 
3.4. Cointegration analysis 
The use of cointegration technique allowed the study to capture the equilibrium 
relationship between non-stationary series within a stationary model, following 
Adam (1998:26), Johnston & Dinardo (1997:266). Furthermore, cointegration 
avoids both the spurious and inconsistent regression problems, which would have 
otherwise occurred with the regression of non-stationary data series. It also 
permitted the combination of the long-run and short-run information in the same 
model and overcame the problems of losing information that might occur from 
attempts to address non-stationary series through differencing (Adam, 1998). 
Cointegration technique makes it possible to capture the information of non-
stationary series without sacrificing the statistical validity of the estimated tax 
equations.  
Testing for cointegration is done through estimation of the Engle-Granger 
cointegrating relationships (Granger, 1986 and Engle et al, 1987). The test involves 
detecting whether the regression residuals are stationary or non-stationary. The 
ADF and the Philip-Perron (PP) unit root tests were performed on the regression 
residuals for this purpose. The PP unit root test for regression residuals was 
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performed because Pierre (1989) argued that the presence of unusual circumstances 
might invalidate conventional ADF unit root test (Johnston & Dinardo, 1997). 
Other diagnostic tests performed included normality test using Jarque-Bera 
statistic, the Breusch-Godfrey asymptotic test for serial autocorrelation (LM), 
ARCH residuals test, homoscedasticity, white heteroskedasticity test, and the 
Ramsey RESET test for specification error, Chow forecast test and CUSUM test 
for parameter constancy.  
The years that had experienced unusual observations were determined after the 
graphical inspection of the regression residuals from the initial formulation of the 
cointegrating relation showed dramatic spikes either downward or upwards. The 
dummy variables were used depending on whether or not their inclusion improve 
the adjusted R-squared and Durbin-Watson statistic, and at the same time, reduced 
the standard error of regression.  
The elasticity estimates are derived from the meaningful long run relationships 
that passed a battery of diagnostic tests. For Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) models, the elasticity estimates were calculated using the procedure 
outlined by Johnston & Dinardo (1997), Hill, Griffiths, & Judge (2001).  
The ARDL relation is given as; 
 
A (L) Yt = m + B1 (L) Xt + B2 (L) X2t +  t                 (12) 
 
and the implied long run relationship is: 
 
ỹ = 

 2
21
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
X
A
B
X
A
B
A
m
t                 (13) 
 
Where; 
A (1) = 1- sum of the coefficients of lagged dependent variable (y) values 
B1 (1) = Sum of the coefficients of explanatory variable X1. 
B2 (1) = Sum of the coefficients of explanatory variable X2. 
The three sums are to be significantly different from zero for a cointegrating 
relationship to exist. Thus the existence of a cointegrating relationship is confirmed 
by testing whether A (1), B2 (1) and B2 (1) are zero. Testing that A (1) is zero, is 
equivalent to testing that the sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent (y) 
terms is equal to one. The short run elasticity estimates are the coefficients of the 
non-lagged explanatory variables, while the long run elasticity estimates are 
computed using the formula: 
 
)1(
)1(1
A
B
, and
)1(
)1(2
A
B
, for X1 and X2 respectively.  
 
3.5. Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis was vital because violation of one of the assumptions of the 
Ordinary Least Squares method that the explanatory variables should not be 
strongly collinear would have impaired the efficiency of the estimated parameters 
or made their estimation impossible. 
The procedure that is explained by Koutsoyiannis (1988) is used to detect the 
presence of multicollinearity. The procedure involve gradually inserting additional 
variable in the estimating equation and examining its effects on the individual 
coefficient, on the student t-values, and on the overall adjusted R-squared. If the 
variable improved adjusted R-squared without rendering the individual coefficients 
unacceptable on a priori consideration, the variable was considered useful and 
retained as an explanatory variable. If the new variable did not improve adjusted R-
squared and did not affect, to any considerable extent, the values of the individual 
coefficients, it was considered superfluous and was excluded from the regression. 
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If the new variable adversely affected the sign or the value of the coefficient, it was 
considered detrimental to estimation results and was rejected as an explanatory 
variable. 
 
3.6. Data  
Data collection guidelines were used to collect the data for the study. Time 
series data were obtained from Quarterly Budgetary Reviews, International 
Monetary Fund Financial Statistics Year Books, International Monetary Fund 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks, Economic Surveys, Budget Speeches, 
Statistical Abstracts and National Development Plans. Other sources included 
library desk studies and visits to the Ministry of Finance (MF), KRA, Kenya 
Institute of Public Policy and Research (KIPPRA), African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), The World Bank local office, and Ministry of Planning and 
National Development (MPND), where a substantial amount of materials and 
records were obtained.   
Both dependent and independent nominal variables were converted to real 
variables, measured in constant (1995) Kenya shillings. Time series data for 
average GDP and its related variables were converted from their nominal values to 
their real values by dividing nominal values with the GDP deflator using 1995 as 
the base year. The deflator was chosen because it is the most comprehensive price 
index for GDP (Branson, 1989). Furthermore, it correctly measures inflation since 
it amounts to a weighted average of the changes in all prices of newly produced 
goods in the economy (Dernburg, 1985). Hence it had the advantage of 
incorporating all the newly produced goods in the economy and allowed for 
changes in composition of output (Dernburg, 1985).   
The reason for the conversion of nominal average value of GDP to real average 
value of GDP is that the nominal average figures do not reflect changes in 
production and income caused by inflation that leads to prices rising when the 
quantities are falling.  Furthermore, the real values are measures of aggregate 
production that eliminates the effects of inflation and shows what is happening to 
economic activities, apart from movement in prices.   
Tax revenues were converted to their real values by dividing their nominal 
values with the consumer price index (CPI). This avoided biased results caused by 
inflation. The CPI was used because it falls on the expenditure side of the GDP 
equation. Furthermore, CPI is more of a cost-of-living index (Dernburg, 1985), and 
hence it is the right one to employ for tax revenues which have the effect of 
reducing disposable personal income. The other reason for its application is that it 
includes the cost of imports and some items that are not actually goods and services 
that affect the cost-of-living.  
Population is used in this study as a control factor. This is in recognition of the 
fact that population growth rate has serious implications on demand for public 
goods and services and thus on tax revenues that fund these goods and services. 
High population growth rate is also associated with high illiteracy rate and low 
education level that make it difficult to implement tax policies. Population enters 
the tax revenue equations as an independent variable so as to determine its 
influence on tax yields from various sources. Second, all the nominal variables 
were divided by population to convert them into their per capita values. These sets 
of results are also reported. 
The year 1995 is chosen as the base year because most macroeconomic 
variables showed normal performance during this year.  Furthermore, apart from 
being a more recent year, it is a year during which few changes were experienced 
in the economy. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Findings of stationarity and cointegration analysis 
The unit root test was performed in order to detect whether there existed 
stationary or non-stationary series closely following Dickey & Fuller (1979), 
Mackinnon (1991) and Thomas (1997). The tests showed that the time series for all 
the variables were non-stationary at levels using 1 percent critical value. The first 
difference for all the variables did not exhibit unit roots, which means that the data 
were stationary at first difference. Furthermore, the conventional test, assuming an 
intercept and four lags did not reject the unit root hypothesis at the first difference.  
The results of the unit root tests for cointegration of variables confirmed that the 
regression residuals for different specification of the VAT model that were 
estimated were stationary, which implied the existence of cointegrating 
relationships.  
 
4.2. Distribution and other properties of variables 
Before accepting the results of the dynamic specification, it was important to 
ensure that the equations estimated tracked the data well. Therefore distribution 
and other properties of variableswere performed. This ensured that the VAT 
models captured the salient features of the data and was consistent with economic 
theory.  
The histogram-normality test (Jarque-Bera test) is a test of the distribution of 
the error term and it uses the first four moments of the distribution namely mean, 
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. The results of the Jarque-Bera test had 
probability values greater than 0.05, hence the normality assumptions of the 
regression residuals for all the estimated equations were not rejected. The 
regression residuals therefore followed a normal distribution, which meant that the 
OLS estimates obtained were efficient and consistent. 
Two types of autocorrelation tests were performed. These were the DW statistic 
test for first order autocorrelation and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for higher 
order autocorrelation. This was in recognition of the fact that OLS models assume 
serial independence in the residuals (Maddala, 1977, Greene, 1990). The DW 
statistics were close to two (2) and in some cases greater than two, implying no 
evidence of autocorrelation. However, the standard DW statistic was not a 
sufficient test for autocorrelation since all regressors were not strictly exogenous 
and the error process was not considered to be of the first order. The DW statistic 
was therefore a test of only the first order auto correlation and had relatively low 
power (see Adam, 1998, Thomas, 1997).  Furthermore, the presence of lagged 
dependent variable in the tax models might have tended to bias the DW test 
statistic towards two (2). 
To offset the shortcomings of the use of DW test statistic, the LM test was 
performed. The LM test is a general test for high order autocorrelation and is 
relatively more powerful than the DW test, especially for this study, where higher 
order lagged dependent variables were included as regressors and the error process 
was AR (M). The LM test was performed by regressing regression residuals on 
their own lagged values up to the sixth lag. The appropriate lag lengths were 
determined by the AIC and the Schwarz criterion. From the results, the hypotheses 
of zero autocorrelation in the residuals were not rejected. This was because the 
probabilities were greater than 0.05.  The LM test did not therefore reveal serial 
correlation problems for the VAT models. 
In recognition of the fact that there might be autocorrelation disturbances in the 
series leading to homoscedasticity (Johnson & Dinardo, 1997 and Engle, 1982a), 
the ARCH test was performed with one up to six lags. Furthermore, although the 
problem of heteroscedasticity is mostly encountered in cross-section data (see for 
example Johnson & Dinardo, 1997 and Engle, 1982b), in this study, the white 
heteroscedasticity test was performed on the residuals as a precaution.  
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The results of the ARCH test showed probabilities of individual coefficients 
lying between 0.13 and 0.99, with probability of F-statistics lying between 0.11 and 
0.96. These high probabilities meant that the assumption of homoscedastic 
residuals for the estimated tax equations could not be rejected in favour of the 
ARCH residuals. Furthermore, the results of white test showed very high 
probabilities that were greater than 0.05, which rejected the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.   
Considering Ramsey (1969) and Ramsey & Schmidt (1976) argument that 
various specification errors such as omitted variables, incorrect functional form, 
correlation between independent variables and the error term, give rise to non zero 
error term vector (Johnson & Dinardo, 1997) the performance of the Ramsey 
RESET test was inevitable. The test was performed to determine whether there 
were specification errors. The results showed high probability values that were 
greater than 0.05, meaning that there was no significant evidence of miss-
specification.  
According to Johnson & Dinardo (1997), an estimated equation should have 
relevance for data outside the sample used in the estimation.  In recognition of this 
fact, the Chow Forecast test was performed to determine the parameter constancy 
following Chow (1960). Observations from 1964/65 to 1994/95 were used for 
estimation and those from 199596 to 2002/03 for testing. To avoid the F-statistic 
overstating the true significance level, disturbances were checked for the absence 
of heteroscedasticity first before the Chow test was performed. The results showed 
probability values that were greater than 0.05, implying that the estimated 
parameters were constant. 
Considering the fact that the study used time series data where time gives a 
unique ordering of the data (Johnson & Dinardo, 1997), recursive estimations were 
performed for each tax equation in order to detect specification errors through 
estimated parameter inconstancy. The CUSUM test, CUSUM residual squares test, 
one-step-forecast test, N-step forecast test and recursive coefficient tests were 
performed. In all cases, there were no residuals lying outside the two standard error 
bands, suggesting that the parameters were constant. 
The t-statistic was used to test the hypothesis that a coefficient was equal to 
zero. Two methods were used in this study to interpret the t-statistic. The first 
method was to observe its estimated value. If the computed t-statistic for a 
coefficient was greater than 1.96 or smaller than -1.96, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. If, on the other hand, the computed t-statistic was smaller than 1.96 or 
greater than -1.96 the null hypothesis was accepted (Koutsoyiannis, 1988). The 
second method was the probability (p-value) of observing the t-statistic given that 
the coefficient was equal to zero. At 5 percent significance level, a p-value lower 
than 0.05 was taken as evidence to reject the null hypothesis, while at the 1 percent 
significance level, a p-value lower than 0.01 led to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis. The standard errors of regression (which are the standard deviations of 
the regression residuals) were also small, meaning that the estimated VAT 
equations tracked the data well.  
Degrees of freedom, which are the number of variables that can vary freely, 
were used to perform tests of the reliability of estimates obtained. The number of 
degrees of freedom associated with sum of squares was given by the number of 
observations used to compute the sum of squares minus the number of parameters 
that had to be replaced by their sample estimates or restrictions placed on the 
variables used to form the sum of squares. The degrees of freedom associated with 
the sum of squares in all the estimated tax equations were large; hence the 
estimated results are reliable.  
The F-statistic was used to test the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients 
(excluding the constant) in the estimated tax equations were zero. The p-values for 
the F-statistics were zero, which led to the rejection of the null hypothesis that all 
slope coefficients were equal to zero. This meant that the corresponding adjusted 
R-squared statistics were different from zero. Therefore, the effect of all the 
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independent variables on the tax revenue for each tax equation was jointly different 
from zero. 
 
4.3. Determinants of VAT revenues  
In the light of the reported results of various diagnostic tests, the VAT revenue 
equations were deemed well specified on statistical grounds and were therefore 
used to analyze the determinants of VAT revenues. The OLS regression results for 
VAT equations are reported in the table that follows.  
 
Table 1. Determinants of sales tax /VAT revenues (t-statistics are in parenthesis) 
Independent variables  Dependent variables 
log sales 
taxes/ 
VAT 
log per 
capita 
sales tax 
/VAT 
log 
sales 
taxes/ 
VAT 
log per 
capita 
sales tax 
/VAT 
log sales 
tax/ 
VAT 
log per 
capita 
sales 
tax 
/VAT 
log 
sales 
tax/ 
VAT 
log 
per 
capita 
sales  
/VAT 
Constant -10.8 
(-1.5) 
-19.6** 
(-3.1) 
-4.6* 
(-2) 
-2.75 
(-1.0) 
-19** 
(-9) 
-1.88 
(-1.7) 
-15** 
(-4.0) 
-0.56 
(-0.4) 
Oil crisis,  (D = 1 for 
years 1973 and 1979, = 0 
otherwise) 
-2.6** 
(-16.0) 
-4** 
(-16.0) 
-36** 
(-27.7) 
-34** 
(-20.0) 
-0.27** 
(-5.0) 
-0.15* 
(-4) 
-22** 
(-4.0) 
-39** 
(-7.4) 
Abolition of GPT, El 
Nino rains, ethnic strife, 
election fever, drought, 
(D= 1 for 1973, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2008 = 0 
otherwise)  
 
-0.22** 
(-2.9) 
 
-0.17* 
(-3) 
 
-0.2** 
(-6.0) 
 
-0.25** 
(-6.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales tax, favourable 
weather, elements of 
SAPs, VAT, KRA  (D = 
1 for 1973, 1980, 1986, 
1987, 1988, 1990, 1995, 
= 0 otherwise) 
 
0.30** 
(9.0) 
 
0.29** 
(4.0) 
 
0.21** 
(6.8) 
 
0.21** 
(5.1) 
 
0.26** 
(5.5) 
 
0.14* 
(2.6) 
 
 
 
 
log total GDP 1.94** 
(2.7) 
2.78** 
(3.1) 
      
log population -1.2 
(-1.8) 
 -0.5* 
(-1) 
 0.07 
(0.63) 
 0.4** 
(2.8) 
 
log monetary GDP   1.96** 
(5.9) 
1.03** 
(3.7) 
    
Log volume of  imports     1.5** 
(6.7) 
0.68** 
(8) 
  
Third lag of log imports     0.45* 
(2.6) 
-0.17 
(-1.3) 
  
First lag of log sales 
tax/VAT 
    0.59** 
(6.1) 
0.6** 
(8) 
  
log volume of  trade       1.5** 
(3.8) 
0.38 
(1.6) 
Second lag of log 
volume of trade 
      1.00* 
(2.0) 
0.60 
(1.0) 
Third lag of log volume 
of trade 
      -1.7** 
(-3.0) 
-1.10 
(-1.4) 
Fourth lag of log volume 
of  trade 
      1.1** 
(3.2) 
0.90* 
(3) 
Oil crisis*log volume of 
trade 
      1.7** 
(3.7) 
3.9** 
(7.1) 
Adjusted R-squared 
Std. error of regression 
Durbin-Watson 
Degrees  freedom 
F-statistic 
p-value 
0.96 
0.13 
1.8 
30 
133  
0.00 
0.94 
0.14 
1.5 
30 
99  
0.00 
0.99 
0.06 
2.3 
30 
618 
0.00 
0.98 
0.08 
1.8 
30 
300  
0.00 
0.86 
0.07 
2 
30 
20  
0.00 
0.85 
0.09 
2.0 
30 
21 
0.00 
0.92 
0.18 
2 
30 
55 
0.00 
0.90 
0.17 
1.0 
30 
44  
0.00 
Notes: (i) The asterisk (*) and (**) denotes that the relevant parameter estimate is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level and 1 percent level respectively. (ii) Standard error is a ratio of the 
estimated coefficient to its t-statistic. 
 
4.4. Interpretation and Discussion of Estimated Results 
Sales taxes/VAT structure is elastic with respect to total GDP, unlike the long 
run total tax structure in Kenya which was found not to be very sensitive with 
respect to growth in GDP (Ole, 1975, Njoroge, 1993, Adari, 1997, Wawire, 1991, 
2000, 2003, and Muriithi & Moyi, 2003). This means that a percentage change in 
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GDP leads to a more than percentage change in VAT revenue. Moreover, the VAT 
structure is elastic. The coefficients on log monetary GDP has positive sign and is 
statistically significant. This coefficient is greater than that on GDP meaning that 
monetary economic activities are easy to trace for the purpose of taxation than the 
non-monetary ones. This also point to the existence of an underground economy 
that may consist of parallel markets that comprise rent seeking activities, smuggled 
goods and currency, and the informal sector (see also, Osoro, 1995; Mwanza, 
1997).  
The log of volume of trade, its lagged values and the lagged value of log sales 
taxes/VAT revenue, have statistically significant effects on log sales taxes/VAT 
revenue. Therefore, the volume of trade, its previous volume and previous level of 
sales taxes/VAT revenue determine the amount of tax revenue that is collected 
from sales taxes/VAT. This means that changes in GDP and volume of 
international trade lead to a more than proportionate change in VAT revenue from 
this source.  
The elasticities of sales taxes/VAT with respect to log volume of imports and 
log per capita volume of imports are positive and statistically significant, meaning 
that an increase in the volume of imports increases revenue collected from sales 
taxes/VAT levied on the imports. The study also finds that elasticities of sales 
taxes/VAT on volume of trade are greater than those with respect to the volume of 
imports implying an underground economy for imports.  
A positive and significant coefficient was registered on log population. The 
positive coefficient indicates that an increase in population will increase VAT 
revenues. This can be attributed to high demand for taxable goods and services 
associated with population increases and also to the effort by KRA to target 
taxpayers in order to enhance tax compliance through introduction of electronic tax 
register. 
The reforms and unusual circumstances that were experienced in the economy 
that positively influenced the VAT yields include introduction of sales tax (1973), 
coffee and tea booms (1976, 1977, and 1986), introduction of sales tax on imports 
(1984/85), budget rationalization programme (1985), and establishment of KRA in 
1995.  Others are favourable weather (1980, 1994, 2001), introduction of some 
elements of SAPs, Tax Management Guidelines (see also Republic of Kenya, 1975, 
1986, 1996, 1997a, 2002a, 2002b, World Bank, 1983, and 2003).    
The unusual circumstances that are found to have had adverse effects on VAT 
yields include oil price shocks (1973, and 1979), droughts and subsequent power 
rationing and the devastating effects of El Nino (1984, 1997, 1998, 2000). Others 
are ethnic violence in some of the high agricultural productive areas of the country 
(1991/92, 1997 and 2008), political uncertainty in the wake of multiparty elections 
(1992, 1997, 2002, 2007), declining tourism activities and travel adversaries by 
trade partners (1991, 1992, 1997), poor infrastructure linked to El Nino (1998) (see 
also Republic of Kenya, 1975, 1994a, 1999a, 2002a, 2002b and 2003, and World 
Bank, 1983, and 2003).   
 
5. Conclusion 
The determinants of VAT include GDP, institutional, demographic, and 
structural features of the economy. Among the notable ones that seem to have had 
positive influences on VAT revenues are introduction of sales tax in 1973, coffee 
and tea booms, introduction of sales tax on imports in the fiscal year 1984/85, 
budget rationalization programme, establishment of KRA in 1995, favourable 
weather, TMG, and the volume of international trade. 
VAT revenues respond with lags to changes in their respective tax bases. This 
means that the previous levels of tax bases (such as GDP, volume of trade, and 
volume of imports) have significant influence on the present levels of VAT 
revenues. This further means that new policy guidelines contained in the budget 
speeches are not usually implemented immediately. Hence the long time lag in the 
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response of the taxes influences VAT revenue collected from various sources at a 
point in time.  
A marked increase in VAT revenue can be achieved if taxable capacity is 
substantially expanded through increased economic activities. These increased 
activities should occur first and foremost in the sectors that attract VAT.  
Expansion of volume of trade especially to non-COMESA countries would be a 
pre-requisite to increasing revenue from VAT on trade.   
The government should rely on VAT because it is elastic and generate revenue 
with limited administrative costs, are less inconveniencing because they are hidden 
in the commodity prices being transacted, present less chances for tax evasion, are 
powerful tools for guiding resources allocation through changing supply and 
demand forces, are more flexible such that rates and coverage can be selective and 
can be modified to suit the objective of the government, apart from taking into 
account the externalities and allowing individuals the choice of whether or not to 
consume the taxed commodities.  
Due to the potential negative effects of the implementation time lags on VAT 
revenues, new policy guidelines contained in the budget speeches and other tax 
policy documents should be implemented, as a matter of urgency, almost 
immediately. 
VAT bases should be broadened and tax rates and special treatment reduced to 
ensure compliance by taxpayers, increase productivity and address the issue of the 
underground economy. In fact, reduction in VAT rate and special treatment may 
greatly increase the effectiveness of the tax reforms (see also Dethier, 1998, Sewell 
& Thirsk, 1997). 
One way of drastically bringing about an improved VATstructure would be to 
provide information bases and taxpayer education through pamphlets 
dissemination, seminars, conferences and barazas (open air meeting with village 
headmen) which might encourage more people to pay taxes. Taxpayers should be 
encouraged to maintain proper audited accounts and observe honesty.  
Population growth rate must be controlled since it impacts negatively on 
domestic VAT revenue. Hence reduction in the birth rate is very vital and tax relief 
for married couples should not encourage large families. However, population was 
found to have a positive effect on VAT revenue from international trade. This calls 
for a balance between the two. 
KRA should put in place an electronic system that links the financial 
institutions (mostly banks) with its integrated system. This will make it easier for 
the KRA to monitor money flows into and out of the personal accounts. The money 
flow can then be compared with the tax returns filed. This exercise will go a long 
way to capture tax evaders/avoiders and reduce the underground economy. 
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